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With this paper we seek to contribute to the literature on pension insurance systems. 
The financial literature tends to focus exclusively on the US pension insurance system. 
This is the first major empirical study to address the German occupational pension 
insurance (PSVaG) plan in Germany.  
The study is based on a Merton-type one-factor model, in which we determine the credit 
portfolio risk profile of the occupational pension insurance plan and compare two 
alternative pricing plans. We find that there is a low, yet non-negligible risk of very 
high losses that may threaten the existence of the occupational pension insurance plan 
(PSVaG). While relating risk premiums to firms’ default probabilities would cause them 
to diverge widely, a marginal risk contribution method would produce less pronounced 
differences compared to the current, uniform pricing plan.  
Keywords: Pension insurance, Risk-adjusted premiums, Credit portfolio risk 
JEL-Classification: G18, G22, G23, G28, C15 Non-Technical Summary 
The book reserve system is the most widespread method of financing occupational 
pension plans in Germany. Pension liabilities are insured by the Pensions-Sicherungs-
Verein VVaG (PSVaG) against bankruptcy. The PSVaG is a mutual insurance 
association with compulsory membership for all firms running unfunded pension plans. 
The insurance premiums are currently independent of individual default probabilities. 
The PSVaG recently stated that the insurance system needed to be reformed, especially 
due to a gradual shift from the book reserve system to funded pensions that can create 
adverse selection problems. In the future, risk-adjusted premiums as foreseen for the 
newly established Pension Protection Fund in UK could become feasible. 
We perform credit portfolio analyses to determine the risk profile of the PSVaG. We 
use the Deutsche Bundesbank’s extensive balance sheet database, which gives us direct 
access to 70% of all pension provisions. What we find is a highly skewed risk 
distribution. The magnitude of a potential tail loss event suggests that there is an upper 
threshold for the ability and willingness of the PSVaG’s members to bear this risk. 
Under an expected loss pricing plan which accounts for individual default probabilities, 
insurance premiums would vary greatly. However, in a marginal risk contribution 
approach the variation of the premiums would be less pronounced. Nichttechnische Zusammenfassung 
Der wichtigste Durchführungsweg der betrieblichen Altersvorsorge in Deutschland ist 
die Direktzusage, für die Pensionsrückstellungen zu bilden sind. Im Fall der Insolvenz 
sind Pensionszusagen durch den Pensions-Sicherungs-Verein VVaG (PSVaG) 
versichert. Der PSVaG ist ein Versicherungsverein auf Gegenseitigkeit. Es besteht eine 
Zwangsmitgliedschaft für alle Unternehmen, die Direktzusagen gewähren. Dabei ist die 
Versicherungsprämie unabhängig vom individuellen Insolvenzrisiko. Der PSVaG selbst 
sieht die Notwendigkeit, das Finanzierungssystem zu reformieren. Hintergrund ist eine 
Strukturverschiebung in der betrieblichen Altersvorsorge zu Gunsten kapitalgedeckter 
Durchführungswege, woraus ein Problem adverser Selektion resultieren kann bei der 
sich Unternehmen mit geringem Risiko aus diesem System der Alterssicherung 
zurückziehen. In der Zukunft könnten risikoadjustierte Prämien, wie sie für den neu 
gegründeten Pension Protection Fund in Großbritannien vorgesehen sind, eingeführt 
werden.
Wir untersuchen das Risikoprofil des PSVaG mittels portfolioanalytischer Verfahren, 
die auf Insolvenzrisiken abzielen. Grundlage ist die Jahresabschluss-Datenbank der 
Deutschen Bundesbank. Diese ermöglicht, rund 70% aller Pensionsrückstellungen 
direkt zu erfassen. Dabei zeigt sich eine extrem schiefe Verlustverteilung. Das Ausmaß 
möglicher Extremschäden legt nahe, dass es eine obere Grenze für die Bereitschaft und 
Fähigkeit der Mitglieder gibt, das derzeit mit Elementen der Quersubventionierung 
behaftete Sicherungssystem des PSVaG zu finanzieren. Risikoadjustierte Prämien, die 
vollständig auf individuelle Insolvenzwahrscheinlichkeiten abstellen, würden allerdings 
zu einer sehr hohen Beitragsspreizung führen. Würde hingegen der marginale 
Risikobeitrag im Portfoliokontext bei der Beitragsbemessung berücksichtigt, ergäbe 
sich eine geringere Spreizung. Content
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Empirical Risk Analysis of Pension Insurance –
The Case of Germany*
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1 Introduction
Occupational pension plans vary widely in design and importance across countries. However, 
specific institutions to insure pensions against bankruptcy of the sponsoring company exist 
only in a few countries. Sweden and Finland were the first to establish pension insurance 
systems in the early 1960s, followed by the USA and Germany in 1974 and Japan in 1989. In 
the UK, the first such insurance system was introduced in 1995 as a consequence of the 
Maxwell scandal, in which 30,000 employees lost their pensions when the pension fund assets 
were pledged as collateral. As a result of the severe underfunding of many pension plans and 
several large bankruptcies, the UK government established the Pension Protection Fund 
(PPF), which became operational in April 2005.
The UK’s PPF is consequently based on risk-adjusted premiums according to the default 
probabilities and the insured firms’ funding status. The PPF system reflects the fundamental 
shift in risk management toward greater risk-sensitivity. The Pension Benefit Guarantee 
Corporation (PBCG) in the USA charges a flat premium per insurant, to which a supplemental 
variable premium for underfunding was only added in 1987. In Germany, the Pensions-
Sicherungs-Verein VVaG (PSVaG) premiums are based on the annual cost of the pension 
insurance plan. They are independent of individual default probabilities. 
The financial literature is almost exclusively focused on the PBGC. Since its inception, 
several authors have pointed out the moral hazard problems created by non risk-sensitive 
premiums and the pricing problem which can be linked to a conditional put option (Sharpe 
1976 and Treynor 1977). Several articles apply the option pricing framework developed by 
Black and Scholes (1973) and Merton (1973) to approximate the cost of insurance under 
numerous simplifications. They provide illustrative solutions for hypothetical pension plans 
(Bodie and Merton 1993, Lewis and Pennacchi 1994, Seow 1995) or apply their models to a 
small sample of insured plan sponsors (Marcus 1987, Hsieh et al. 1994, Lewis and Pennacchi 
1999). VanDerhei (1990) uses a large sample of plans and sets premiums directly equal to the 
product of the risk of an insufficient termination times the amount of exposure. Many of the 
risks involved are exemplified by the savings and loan crisis of the late 1980s (Bodie and 
Merton 1993, Bodie 1996).
* We thank Klaus Düllmann, Frank Heid, Thilo Liebig and Christoph Memmel for their valuable comments. 2
In Germany, the PSVaG has almost been completely ignored in financial research. The only 
empirical study has been carried out by Grünbichler (1991), who exemplarily calculated risk 
adjusted insurance premiums for a sample of 22 large listed corporations using a Merton-type 
approach (Merton 1973, 1977). He found a highly skewed distribution of risk-based insurance 
premiums. 
Attempts to measure the overall long-term risk of the PBGC were made by Estrella and Hirtle 
(1988) and Lewis and Cooperstein (1993). The full conceptual complexity of the pension 
insurance system is addressed within an integrated framework by Boyce and Ippolito (2002), 
who use the stochastic Pension Insurance Modeling System (PIMS) introduced by the PBGC 
in 1998 to analyze the risk profile as well as a variety of pricing plans. By contrast, the 
PSVaG currently does not use any stochastic modeling techniques to capture its counterparty 
risk.
In this paper, we use credit portfolio techniques to analyze the PSVaG’s risk structure. We 
focus on two central questions: 
First, how risky is the current portfolio of the PSVaG in terms of expected and unexpected 
losses? We directly relate the risk faced by the PSVaG to the riskiness of the individual 
members. Our empirical research is based on the Deutsche Bundesbank’s extensive balance 
sheet database, which allows us to directly cover 70% of all pension provisions. What we find 
is a highly skewed loss distribution. There is a small, yet non-negligible probability for the 
occurrence of portfolio losses that substantially exceed historical levels. Given the magnitude 
of such a potential tail loss event, it can be assumed that there is an upper threshold for the 
ability and willingness of PSVaG’s members to bear this risk. 
Second, how can pension insurance pricing reflect the discrete risk contribution by individual 
corporations to the PSVaG? In an expected loss pricing plan similar to that of the PPF, 
insurance premiums would vary widely. However, the current practice of cross-subsidization 
appears to be less distinctive in a marginal risk contribution approach. 
This paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we briefly outline the German pension 
insurance system. Section 3 and 4 describe our method and our data. In section 5, we analyze 
the loss distribution faced by the PSVaG. In section 6 we show the effects of the different 
pricing plans. Section 7 concludes.3
2 The German pension insurance system
Germany is one of the few countries where the internal funding of pension obligations via 
book reserves is an accepted standard. The German system of internally financed pension 
plans emerged in the aftermath of the Second World War. Like all other economic sectors, the 
banking industry was devastated and the capital market defunct. External financing was 
hardly available. In addition, the Allied forces imposed marginal tax rates of up to 90 percent 
on company profits. By disclosing a liability for future pension payments, taxation (as well as 
wages) could be deferred and the retained funds could be used for reconstruction. In many 
cases, pension plans were negotiated with work councils and established through collective 
agreements. Thus, from today’s perspective, the internal financing of pensions can be 
regarded as an important component of the “Wirtschaftswunder”. 
When pensions are internally financed, the companies accrue book reserves corresponding to 
the present value of pension commitments as liabilities in their balance sheets and write off 
the accruals from their taxable income. For tax purposes, the pension liabilities are calculated 
using a uniform discount rate of six percent and standardized biometric assumptions. Income 
tax does not fall due until the pensions are actually paid and the book reserves are drawn 
down. The German book reserve system thus integrates the pension plan into the sponsor’s 
corporate financial structure. This system may be interpreted as a form of funding with an 
extreme asset allocation. This makes it comparable to a pension fund which only holds bonds 
issued by the sponsoring company.  
Today, the accrual of book reserves is still the most widespread method of financing 
occupational pension plans in Germany, accounting for almost 60 percent of total pension 
liabilities in 2004. In our sample, book reserves make up an average of 10.8 percent of the 
firm’s assets. Large firms tend to have a higher portion of book reserves in their balance 
sheets, reaching as much as 25 percent in some cases. 
For many years, pension entitlements were not protected in the event of bankruptcy. In theory, 
funding insures against this risk as, in the event of bankruptcy, the pension fund is used to pay 
out what is due to the pensioners. In a book reserve system, only the remaining assets can be 
used to serve pension obligations. Therefore, in 1974 an obligatory insolvency insurance 
system was set up and institutionalized through the PSVaG. The insurance system was a way 
to maintain the necessary public support for book reserve funding.  4
The PSVaG is the German counterpart to the Pension Benefit Guarantee Corporation (PBGC) 
in the United States.
2 The PSVaG was founded in the same year when extensive new 
legislation governing occupational pension plans was passed in both countries. Like the 
United States, events in Germany were very much influenced by the failure of a car 
manufacturer (Studebaker in the USA and Borgward in Germany). However, the PSVaG is 
not a federal agency. It was established by the Confederation of German Employers’ 
Associations (BDA), the Federation of German Industries (BDI) and the Association of 
German Life Insurance Corporations. The PSVaG operates as a private mutual insurance 
association with compulsory membership for all firms running pension plans which might be 
adversely affected in the case of insolvency.
3 About 90 percent of all insured pension 
liabilities are related to book reserves.
4 The PSVaG is regulated by Bundesanstalt für 
Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht (BaFin), the German federal financial supervisor. 
In an insolvency, the PSVaG purchases annuities from a consortium of private life insurance 
companies covering the present value of all pensions which are already paid. In 2004 the 
consortium was made up of 59 insurance companies. Entitlements are not pre-financed until 
they are due. The original idea of not pre-financing entitlements was to keep the assets as long 
as possible within the companies, where they could be used more efficiently. The present 
value of entitlements to be financed in the future amounts to approximately one percent of all 
insured pensions. The cost of a bankruptcy case is thereby smoothed over up to 30 years. 
Additionally, the PSVaG operates an emergency fund with a target funding level of the 
moving five-year average cost of annual pension insurance. It is drawn on in years with 
exceptionally high pension insurance costs. 
The PSVaG is financed by insurance premiums which do not reflect individual insolvency 
risks but are instead based on pension liability-weighted rates relative to the annual cost of the 
pension insurance plan.
5 There is no cap on annual premiums. It is generally assumed that 
taxpayers provide no implicit hedge function and that a catastrophic loss can be smoothed out 
in the long run as pension liabilities could also be met on a pay-as-you-go basis (see e.g. 
Heubeck 1985). 
2   From 2002 on, some companies from Luxembourg have also been covered by the pension insurance plan. 
They account for less than one percent of all insurants. 
3   The insured event is insolvency. The Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 in the United 
States originally used a termination insurance concept. 
4   The PSVaG also insures support funds which are often only partially funded and, in principle, allow for 
reinvestment in the sponsoring company. Life insurance contracts which are pledged as collateral or 
revocable are also insured but play nearly no role.  
5   At the beginning of each year a rough estimate based on recent experience is made and an initial premium 
is charged in advance. 5
In 2004, the PSVaG insurance covered 8.5 million beneficiaries and the notional value of 
insured pensions was €243 billion. From 1975 to 2004, the annual insurance premiums ranged 
from 0.03% to 0.69%, averaging 0.22% (Table 1). With some exception, most claims 
involved small and medium sized companies (SMEs). 
Table 1: Descriptive statistics on the PSVaG for the period 1975-2004
6
 Mean  Median  Min  Max  Std.  dev. 
Insurance premium  0.22%  0.20%  0.03%  0.69%  0.14% 
Defaults 333.4  330.0  154  705  143.8 
The PSVaG tries to limit the risk of moral hazard by several measures. The maximum pension 
in 2004 is limited to €7,245 per month or a lump sum of €869,400. Increases granted within 
two years prior to insolvency are generally not insured, and the insurance can be withdrawn if 
benefits were committed during a period of impending bankruptcy. In this way, business 
owners, although generally allowed to use the book reserve system to finance their own 
pension, are usually not covered.
Throughout its history, the PSVaG has always maintained a low profile. To the general public 
its existence is almost unknown, even to those who receive their pension through the 
consortium of life insurance companies. The safety of occupational pension plans is generally 
not questioned by the public. This might be attributed to the PSVaG’s successful and 
inconspicuous mode of operation, which has given companies ongoing and unquestioned 
access to internal financing via the book reserve system in the past.  
However, most recently the legislation governing occupational pension plans and private 
pension contracts was reformed comprehensively, mainly to reduce dependency on the public 
pay-as-you-go pension system, which is being increasingly strained by an aging population. 
In addition, pension funds were introduced in 2002 as an alternative financing source. They 
allow a maximum underfunding of five percent, and only five percent of their assets may be 
invested in the sponsoring corporation. If properly funded, book reserves can be outsourced to 
pension funds non-taxably. Pension funds are also covered by the PSVaG, but the premiums 
are reduced to one-fifth of those of pension provisions. Many cash-rich companies have 
declared themselves willing to at least partially fund their pension liabilities. Currently, 
pension funds are primarily used only for new commitments often financed by employees 
6   Source: Pensions-Sicherungs-Verein (2005a). 6
themselves who can convert parts of their wages into pension entitlements utilizing tax 
advantages. The main reason is a discount rate for future obligations, which was originally 
2.75 percent, as in the insurance industry. Since mid-2005, however, it has been possible to 
apply a discount rate in line with international accounting standards. Meanwhile, several firms 
have established contractual trust agreements (CTAs) to fund their pension liabilities and 
cancel them in their balance sheets according to US-GAAP or IAS/IFRS.
7 Within the 
changing institutional environment, adverse selection effects can be expected, as firms that 
can afford funding will tend to do so, leaving the other group to deteriorate in quality. 
In May 2005, the management board of the PSVaG declared that the financing system needed 
to be changed. The proposed reforms include the immediate pre-financing of all entitlements 
in the case of insolvency, an enforced pre-financing of existing entitlements and an additional 
mechanism to smooth annual premiums. In the long run, the reformed system could be the 
basis for risk-adjusted premiums. The management board has justified the proposed reforms 
by pointing to the risk of declining contributions and to the fact that pre-funding of pensions 
is now widely accepted in Germany.
8
3 Method
In this section, we will outline the underlying methodology for measuring the portfolio risk of 
the PSVaG and the risk contribution by each firm. 
We regard the PSVaG’s members as counterparties, which may default.
9 Unlike a typical 
credit portfolio, the recovery of PSVaG’s exposure is usually negligible, and the severity of 
losses hence considerable, thereby underscoring the importance of carefully monitoring the 
risk structure of the PSVaG portfolio. The portfolio can be regarded as a cross-sectional credit 
portfolio of the German industry. However, the exposure distribution of the PSVaG portfolio 
is substantially more heavily concentrated than a typical credit loan portfolio, as there is no 
upper size limit for the exposure. 
In order to monitor the inherent risk of a credit portfolio, financial institutions usually refer to 
an ex-ante forecast of the portfolio loss probability distribution function (Loss PDF). For our 
study, we refer to a Merton-type one-factor model. We calculate the expected loss (EL) and 
7   The most prominent example is the Siemens Pension Trust, with assets in excess of ten billion Euro. In the 
case of CTAs, the pension liabilities still appear on the pension sheet under German accounting rules. 
8   See Pensions-Sicherungs-Verein (2005b) as well as Gerke and Heubeck (2002).  
9   We define default as insolvency. In the banking industry, payment that is over 90 days past due is often 
considered to be in default. 7
unexpected loss (UL) for the PSVaG portfolio. While the first ratio reflects the average 
portfolio loss to be expected ex ante, the UL represents the difference between the Value-at-
Risk (VaR) and the EL. The UL is usually measured in terms of the VaR or the expected 
shortfall (ES), relative to a specific confidence level and time horizon (see figure 1).
10 We 
refer to confidence levels similar to those used in the banking and insurance industries.
Let PDi denote the annual default probability of an insured PSVaG firm and LGDi (loss given 
default) the portion of the pension provisions (EADi, exposure at default) lost in a default 
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The ELp is by definition not affected by credit correlations and can therefore be determined 
analytically. The unexpected loss of a credit portfolio, by contrast, depends on the correlations 
of the exposures in the portfolio. We will determine the PSVaG’s UL by means of Monte 
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where RM(x) is the portfolio risk measure and xj represents each j firm’s pension 
provisions.
12 We will use the VaR and the ES as measures of the portfolio risk. 
                                                
10   The 99.9% VaR, for example, measures what will be the maximum loss over one year, if one assumes that 
the one year period will not be one of the (100-0.1)% one year periods that are the worst under normal 
conditions. The ES measures the expected loss conditional on exceeding a certain confidence level and has 
been suggested by Artzner et al. (1999) as a coherent risk measure. 
11   A formal development of the risk contribution can be found in Theiler (2004), for example.
12   We use the Euler allocation principle to determine the premium that should be paid by each firm. This is the 
only loss allocation principle that generates additive representations of the overall portfolio risk, which is 
risk-adjusted but simultaneously takes all diversification effects into account (see e.g. Tasche (2004)). 8
Figure 1: Loss probability distribution function (Loss PDF) of a credit portfolio 
The x-axis shows actual losses as a percentage of the portfolio exposure. Accordingly, the EL is the average 
expected portfolio loss and UL the loss referring to the difference between a tail quantile, usually the VaR or the 
ES, and the EL. On the y-axis, the loss frequencies are shown.  
The credit risk default process is modeled based on a stylized Merton-type asset value model 
(Merton 1974) with one common systematic risk factor and the remaining disturbance being 
idiosyncratic. We assume that each firm’s creditworthiness is represented by its asset value, 
which fluctuates over time and reflects the actual state of the firm’s creditworthiness. Asset 
returns are normally distributed (Bluhm et al. 2003). We use a one-year horizon and control 
for asset values falling below a certain barrier (usually the liabilities of a firm), what 
implicates a default event. The asset values of larger firms have a higher correlation with the 
systematic factor, i.e. implying that they are more strongly influenced by macroeconomic 
developments. Rather than using a continuous relationship between the firm size and the 
correlation with the systematic factor, we refer to three discrete size groups. 
Let us suppose that a firm defaults if its asset value xi falls short of a specific default barrier 
yi..
We then proceed as follows. First, we assume that each firm’s default barrier can be inferred 
via its default probability (PDi):
1() ii i xy P D
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Second, we randomly draw a systematic factor Z and an idiosyncratic shock İi for each firm 
andthereby determine the asset returns of the firms in the sample (xi):
2 1 ii i i xZ UU H     (4) 
where i U  is the correlation of the firm’s asset return with the systematic factor.
13 We then 
apply a Monte Carlo simulation to determine the portfolio loss distribution. 
4 Data
What sets the PSVaG apart from other financial institutions is that its portfolio can be 
observed “from the outside”, as book reserves are on balance sheet and calculated in a 
uniform manner. In order to analyze the PSVaG’s risk profile, we use the Bundesbank’s 
balance sheet database. The original dataset has been edited in order to match the PSVaG 
portfolio as best as possible. The mapping is based on historical insurance losses over the 
1975-2004 period, the annual total volume of insured pensions, and the size and default 
information structure of the PSVaG portfolio. 
Our final dataset consists of 145,347 balance sheet datasets (subsequently referred to as 
observations) from the 1989-2002 period, including 839 insolvencies. About 70% of all book 
reserves of the PSVaG are directly accessible. Companies with book reserves of less than 
€100,000 are excluded from the analysis, as they represent less than one percent of the insured 
volume and contribute negligibly to portfolio risk. 
5 The loss distribution faced by the PSVaG 
We determine the annual default probability of each borrower (PDi) with a binary logit model 
which is calibrated based on the sample dataset in a cross-sectional context, i.e. by using all 
data from 1989 to 2002.
14
The binary logit model takes the common form: 
                                                
13   The asset correlation equals the squared correlation of the firm’s asset returns with the systematic factor. 













where (PDi) is the default probability of firm i. We use 6 regression variables (xi,j): four 
financial ratios and two sector dummies.
15 With respect to the default definition, we use 
balance sheet data with a time gap of 12 to 24 months prior to default.  
The outcome is shown below.
Table 2: Outcome of binary logistic regression 
Variable Coef.  Std.  Err.  P>|z| 
Constant -3.4794*** .10002  0.000 
Equity/Assets   -4.6610*** .3746  0.000 
log Assets -.11557*** .02699  0.000 
Short-term assets/Short-term liabilities  -1.6456*** .11960  0.000 
Result from ordinary operations  -5.6924*** .27496  0.000 
Dummy Trade   -.50999*** .11001  0.000 
Dummy Other  .51713*** .13569  0.000 
Note: The significance and robustness of the outcome is supported by the Pseudo R² (0.1622), the Wald test and 
the likelihood ratio test. ***/**/* indicate statistically significant results at the 1%, 5% and 10% level. 
We observe that all variables are highly significant, that the signs of the variables are as 
expected, and that the discriminatory power of the calibrated logit model yields an area under 
the receiver operation characteristic (ROC) curve of 0.8181. An ROC curve to evaluate the 
outcome of the logistic regression model is shown below. The figure shows the cumulative 
percentage of the total sample according to the PDi of our logistic regression model on the x-
axis, estimated ex ante, and the cumulative percentage of the borrowers who have defaulted 
ex post on the y-axis.
16
                                                
15   It has been found that the sector construction has the same properties as the sector other.
16   The ROC methodology is explained in Sobehart et al. (2000), for example. 11
Figure 2: Performance measure of rating models: The ROC curve  
We classify the firms into S & P’s common rating categories, AAA, AA, A, BBB, BB, B and 
CCC. In line with international practice, firms are clustered into grade AAA if their 
regression-based PD is below 0.01%. For the AA segment, the upper bound is 0.04% and for 
the other segments (A, BBB, BB and B) the upper bounds are 0.1%, 0.5%, 2%, and 10%, 
respectively. A firm is assigned to the rating grade CCC if its PD exceeds 10%. The rating 
distribution for the PSVaG portfolio according to the number of observations and the pension 
provisions is shown in Figure 3 below.12
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42% of the observations and 75% of the pension provisions of the PSVaG refer to the 
investment grade segment. This indicates that PSVaG has a better risk structure than many 
bank credit portfolios.
17 The fact that a considerable share of large firms with high pension 
provisions tend to be rated above average has a visible impact on this outcome. Nevertheless, 
there is also a number of top-rated smaller firms. In the sub-investment grade we find 
predominantly small and medium-sized companies. 
Table 3 compares the categories of predicted probabilities implied by the estimated 
coefficients against real default data of Standard & Poor’s from 1981 to 2003.
18 The pattern of 
predicted insolvency rates follows historic default rates quite closely across rating classes.
19
                                                
17   Moody’s (2001, p. 6), for example, underlies average net loan provisions of 0.77% for German banks 
during the period 1989-1999 referring to OECD reports (Various editions of "OECD: Bank Profitability - 
Financial Statements Banks”), which is more than two times the average loss of the PSVaG during the 
same period. 
18   See Standard & Poor’s (2004). 
19   The probability of insolvency is generally lower than the probability of default. 13
Table 3: Historical defaults and estimates insolvency probabilities 
Rating  Historical Defaults in %  Estimated Insolvencies in %* Observations
A 0.05  0.07 44 
BBB 0.37  0.28  252 
BB 1.36  0.92  131 
*Companies with pensions provisions in excess of  €500m  
In a default event, we assume a fixed recovery rate of five percent of the pension provisions 
based on past experience of the PSVaG. Pension provisions are subordinated debt and the 
PSVaG does not follow a rigorous work-out process.
20 The credit exposure is equal to the 
firms’ pension provisions.
21
As to credit dependencies, we will use three different correlations of the firms’ asset values 
with the single systematic risk factor. More specifically, we apply asset correlations of 20% 
for the largest firms (sales > €50m), 10% for SMEs (sales > €10m and < €50m) and 5% for 
retail firms (sales < €10m). The assumption that larger firms exhibit higher asset correlations 
considers empirical findings (e.g. Lopez 2004). The asset correlation levels are consistent 
with assumptions and estimates made by other authors and conservative, closely in line with 
the asset correlations applied in Basel II (BCBS 2004).
22
As the reference case we use a confidence level of 99%, which could be interpreted as the 
worst loss occurring in 100 years. We additionally calculate portfolio risk for a confidence 
level of 99.9%, which refers to the regulatory capital level used in the Basel II framework and 
is commonly applied in the credit risk literature.  
Next, we analyze the one-year credit risk of the current PSVaG for 2004.
23 The expected loss 
(EL) is 0.39% of the insured pension provisions at their actuarial value. The annual premium 
paid to the PSVaG was 0.36% in 2004 and is therefore very close to our sample EL.
24
                                                
20   The usage of a stochastic LGD will, given the low average recovery rate, only give the results marginally 
greater precision, if at all.  
21   In the case of one large corporation we scaled down the exposure to 20%, as the pension liabilities were 
already funded in 2002. This is in line with the PSVaG’s premium policy, which charges only one-fifth for 
pension liabilities financed through pension funds. At present, there is no empirical evidence available 
concerning the funding status in the case of insolvency. For convenience, we did not introduce a stochastic 
LGD in this specific case. 
22   See Bluhm et al. (2003) and the Basel II IRB model (BCBS 2004), for example. 
23   We use the portfolio of 2002 to distinguish between defaulted and non-defaulted firms. We consider the 
balance sheet 12 to 24 months prior to insolvency to be balance sheets related to default events.  
24   The two figures cannot be directly compared for two reasons. One, the annual premium to the PSVaG did 
not fully reflect the cost of pension insurance, as financing was partly deferred to future periods. Another is 
that the expected loss is calculated based on the notional value of pension provisions. Due to lower discount 
rates in the insurance industry, the EL understates the true costs of pension insurance.   14
In order to determine the portfolio’s UL, we perform a Monte Carlo simulation with 100,000 
runs. We thereby check the sensitivity analyses of our credit risk parameters: the PD, the 
exposures and the asset correlations, while keeping the other parameters constant.  
Table 4 shows the results for seven different credit risk parameter settings. The specific 
setting of the simulations with respect to the credit risk parameters is displayed in columns 2 
to 5, and the portfolio risk in terms of expected loss (EL), value at risk (VaR) and expected 
shortfall (ES) are shown in the three last columns. 
Table 4: Credit portfolio loss based on different settings 












case 99.0%  Indiv.  Indiv.  5/10/20 0.39 4.1 6.2 
1 99.9% Indiv.  Indiv. 5/10/20  0.39  9  11.5 
2 99.9% 
Indiv. + 
50% Indiv.   5/10/20  0.58 10.9 13.3 
3 99.9% 
Flat
(1.3%) Indiv.  5/10/20    1.3  20  23.9 
4 99.9%  Indiv.  1 5/10/20    1.09  7.3  8.8 
5 99.9%  Indiv.  Indiv.  2.5/5/10   0.39  7.5  8.5 
6 99.9%  Indiv.  Indiv.  0 0.39  7.3  7.7 
At a confidence level of 99%, the VaR is 4.1% and the ES is 6.2% for the PSVaG portfolio at 
actuarial values. We label this case as the “Reference case”, as this is likely to be the most 
relevant setting for the PSVaG’s risk policy.  
Next, we test the sensitivity of the credit risk parameters by applying six additional 
specifications. While cases 2 and 5 may be regarded as scenarios that can occur if the 
macroeconomic situation changes, the purpose of the stylized (extreme) cases 3, 4 and 6 is to 
test the overall effect of the PD, the size distribution and correlation in order to determine 
their relative effect. 
We underlie six hypotheses. First, we assume that the PSVaG’s losses will rise 
disproportionately if we move to higher quantiles in the tails of the loss PDF. Second, we 
assume that, in a cyclical downturn the PSVaG’s credit risk will increase substantially. Third, 
larger firms are supposed to exhibit lower default probabilities, which smoothens the 15
occurrence of high portfolio losses; fourth, however, the inhomogeneous size distribution of 
the PSVaG firms substantially adds to credit risk. Fifth, we assume that the correlations 
increase and decrease with cyclical effects. Sixth, and finally, we assume that the effect of 
correlation in the PSVaG portfolio exceeds the portfolio risk caused by the size distribution.  
In sum, we can conclude that for all specifications the VaR (and the ES) exceed the EL by a 
considerable amount, i.e. the PSVaG faces the risk of very high losses if losses accumulate in 
an unfavorable year. For a confidence level of 99% (reference case), the VaR is 10 times the 
EL (4.1% vs. 0.39%). On the 99.9% percentile (No.1), the VaR is even more than 20 times 
the EL (9% vs. 0.39%.). This result indicates that the occurrence of a tail risk event might 
threaten the existence of the PSVaG, as such a loss event would be more than 10 times higher 
than the highest historical losses incurred over the last 30 years. However, the probability of 
such high losses occurring is very low. We conclude that an insurance for all loss scenarios 
hardly seems possible, which calls for setting an appropriate target confidence level to cover 
the portfolio risk of the PSVaG.  
We subsequently evaluate cases 2 to 6 and thereby test the corresponding assumptions. By 
default we assume a confidence level of 99%. For the rest of the simulations, we refer to a 
confidence level of 99.9%, which is commonly used in the financial literature. The marginal 
effects would, however, be similar for the 99% quantile as well. We generally refer to the 
results of the VaR, which is an upper threshold of the losses at a certain confidence level.
One of the most relevant issues for the PSVaG is the occurrence of cyclical up- and 
downturns, which lead to lower and higher average default probabilities. For instance, in an 
unfavorable cyclical scenario the default probability can exceed the average by 50%. In this 
scenario, and assuming that the cyclical effect hits all companies in the same way (i.e. all PDs 
increase by 50%), we observe that the EL increases from 0.39% to 0.58% and the VaR from 
9% to 10.9% (case 2).
Next, we set all PDs to a flat level of 1.3% (case 3). By consequence, portfolio risk increases 
substantially and roughly doubles compared to the reference case. This result compared with 
the reference case shows that the larger PSVaG firms exhibit lower than average PDs, which 
reduces the fatness of the tail.  
A test of the effect of the inhomogeneous size distribution by setting all exposures to one unit 
(case 4) results in a reduction of the portfolio risk by approximately 17%. However, the 
average expected loss would almost triple, which in the aggregate would have an even more 
negative impact on the PSVaG than the relatively lower reduction in the tail risk. 16
Nevertheless, the PSVaG exhibits a concentration risk by default, so that this outcome is an 
indicator of the extent of this effect rather than a scenario that may occur.  
If the asset correlations are 50% lower than the correlations in the reference case (case 5), 
which might be caused by cyclical effects, the VaR falls by approximately 17% compared to 
the reference case, and would be only 0.2 percentage point higher than for the case in which 
all PSVAG firms are independent (case 6). 
The following figure shows the loss probability distribution function (loss PDF) for the 
PSVaG (with the parameters as in the reference case) with all portfolio losses above 3% 
treated as a tail cluster. 




































The vertical lines indicate the x% quantiles of the PSVaG losses; The red line, for example, refers to the median 
loss (“50”).
The loss PDF is highly skewed to the right, what indicates that there is a high probability of 
low losses around the EL and a low, yet non-negligible probability of very high losses (tail 
risk) that may threaten the PSVaG.  
Although the premiums to the PSVaG are smoothed by its specific financing mechanism, 
which moves premiums to the mean of the loss distribution, a comparison with the historical 
premiums underpins the robustness of the loss distribution. Over the past 30 years, the 
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quantile (0.69%) of the loss distribution.
25 Had AEG’s looming insolvency not been averted 
by a private settlement in 1982, the corresponding loss of more than two percent would have 
exceeded the 95% quantile. 
6 Risk-adjusted premiums 
The PSVaG’s current uniform pricing plan cross-subsidizes firms and thereby distorts a fair 
competition, as pointed out by the Monopolkomission (2004). Furthermore, risk-adjusted 
premiums can mitigate adverse selection problems.
26 Such premiums can provide a strong 
incentive for those corporations having a high counterparty risk to the PSVaG to fund their 
pension obligations. A recent example of how risk-adjusted premiums can be implemented is 
the insurance plan of the cooperative banks in Germany.  
We compare the non risk-adjusted, uniform pricing plan with two potential risk-adjusted 
pricing methods: EL-based pricing and pricing based on marginal risk contributions. One 
general difference between the PSVaG insurance premium and credit pricing is that the 
former is determined ex post, when the losses have occurred, whereas risk-adjusted credit 
pricing is based on ex ante expectations about potential losses.
27 Nevertheless, one might 
argue that it is reasonable to allocate the ex post losses in a risk-adjusted way to the PSVaG 
members in order to avoid cross-subsidization. 
28
In the case of EL-based pricing, the aim is to cover the average expected costs based on each 
firm’s default risk. Marginal risk contribution-oriented pricing, instead, focuses on tail risk 
events within a portfolio context. Premiums are charged according to each firm’s contribution 
to the catastrophic losses that can occur. An overview of the three different pricing options is 
given below. 
                                                
25   If differences in discount rates of pension provisions and annuities are recognized, both bounds increase. 
26   Financial literature typically points to the moral hazard problems associated with uniform pricing. We have 
neither empirical nor anecdotal evidence of uniform insurance premiums for pension provision causing 
moral hazard problems. 
27    Credit risk pricing is usually based on standard risk costs to cover the expected losses and, additionally, to  
allocate the economic capital costs according to the marginal risk contribution of each exposure. 
28   Alternatively, a risk-adjusted pricing regime might require the firms pay premiums ex ante, which are then 
settled ex post according to the realized losses.  18
Table 5: Specification of the three pricing options and their properties  
Approach Risk-adjusted  Risk  drivers 
Uniform pricing  No Exposure 
Expected loss pricing  Yes  Exposure, Probability of Default 
Marginal risk contribution 
based pricing 
Yes  Exposure, Probability of Default, 
Correlation 
6.1 Expected loss-based pricing 
Applying EL-based pricing to the PSVaG portfolio rather than uniform pricing reveals that 
the premium for investment grade firms is reduced substantially, while the non-investment 
grade firms face much higher premiums than before. For the AAA segment, for example, the 
reduction would be 99%, while the premium for the CCC-rated segment would increase by 
more than 15 times as shown in Table 6 below. 
Table 6: Uniform pricing vs. EL-based pricing 
Rating PD in %  Portfolio loss contribution in %  Change in %
Uniform EL-based
AAA < 0.01 0.65 0.007  -99
AA 0.01 - 0.04 3.46 0.24  -93
A 0.05 - 0.1 17.24 3.56 -84
BBB 0.1 - 0.5 58.07 34.26 -36
BB 0.5 - 2 18.75 44.08  +156
B 2 - 10 1.78 15.85  +460
CCC > 10 0.05 1.99  +1560
   100.00  100.00   
The average impact of EL-based pricing is quite different for small and large firms. Small and 
medium-sized firms (SMEs) have an average PD of 1.38% while the largest 30 have an 
average PD of 0.41%.
29 The insurance premium for an average SME would increase by 
195%, while the 30 largest firms would contribute 25% less than under the uniform pricing 
regime.  
                                                
29   Firms with a turnover of less than €50 million. 19
Grünbichler (1991) finds very similar results for a sample of 22 corporations. For two-thirds 
of the firms he calculates substantially lower premiums. In some cases, the risk-adjusted 
premium is reduced by more than 99%. However, the premium increases more than six-fold 
for the riskiest company. The pricing plan of the Pension Protection Fund in the UK is based 
on expected losses and uses 100 risk bands. The risk-adjusted premium for a firm in the 
highest risk band is 203 times that of a firm in the lowest, both pension plans having the same 
funding status. 
6.2 Marginal risk contribution-oriented pricing 
Risk-adjusted premiums based on the marginal risk contribution of each PSVaG firm take into 
account the creditworthiness of a firm as well as its size and the dependence structure in the 
portfolio. It is the most comprehensive pricing approach. We use a 90% confidence level here. 
We calculate the impact of marginal risk contribution based-pricing on the premium again for 
small and large firms in order to compare them to the EL-based pricing regime. This is done 
as follows. Given that the portfolio loss exceeds the 90% quantile, we calculate the average 
loss contribution of each firm. Subsequently, we estimate the average conditional loss 
contribution of each firm, which is then compared to the uniform pricing case. Accordingly, 
the average premium for the largest 30 corporations decreases by 31% relative to the uniform 
pricing plan (EL: minus 35%), whereas the premium paid by SMEs increases by only 46% 
(EL: plus 195%) as shown below. 
Table 7: Comparison of the two risk-adjusted pricing plans 
Pricing contribution (relative to uniform pricing) 
Pricing Plan  SMEs  Larger firms  30 Largest firms 
EL-based +195%  +15%  -35% 
Marginal risk 
contribution
+46% +26% -31% 20
7 Conclusion
In this paper, we analyze the portfolio risk structure of the PSVaG with a benchmark dataset 
provided by the Deutsche Bundesbank. Specifically, we compare the risk faced by the PSVaG 
as a mutual insurance organization directly to the riskiness of the individual members in its 
portfolio. This problem can be broken down into familiar components of contemporary credit 
analysis. We thus treat the counterparty risk of pension provision like that of standardized, 
unsecured loans. In line with Basel II and Solvency II, we estimate the cumulative loss 
distribution of PSVaG-insured members. With an average of more than ten thousand 
corporations per year we have direct access to about 70% of all insured pension provisions.  
The loss distribution is highly skewed. We find that the expected loss is lower than in an 
average credit portfolio of a bank.
30 The reason is that many large firms have low default 
probabilities and high exposures, as the PSVaG does not set an upper limit to individual 
exposures. However, the PSVaG portfolio conversely faces a substantial tail risk. There is a 
small, but non-negligible probability of portfolio losses substantially in excess of historical 
levels occurring. In a catastrophic scenario, a large corporation (or a large number of 
corporations) defaults. Given the magnitude of such a potential tail loss event, it can be 
assumed that there is an upper limit to the risk-bearing ability and willingness of the members 
of the PSVaG, which can, at least in theory, be dissolved as an institution. In this case, the 
KfW Bankengruppe would, by law, assume responsibility for organizing an alternative 
pension insurance plan. In its more than 30-year history, the PSVaG’s pension insurance 
system was only challenged when the premium reached an all-time high due to the 
restructuring of AEG in 1982. However, compared to the loss distribution empirically derived 
in this paper, that premium did not reflect a tail event. The general public does not doubt the 
safety of occupational pension plans. 
We are currently seeing a shift in the financing of occupational pension plans. Many large 
corporations that can afford to do so are putting the outsourcing of pension provisions high on 
their agenda. If properly funded, pension provisions can be canceled out of their balance 
sheets. In 2002, the PSVaG reduced the insurance premium for the newly introduced pension 
funds to one-fifth due to the vastly different exposure given default. The long-term existence 
of the PSVaG as a mutual insurance organization crucially depends on how it is accepted by 
its members. An adverse selection problem may arise when cash-rich corporations fund their 
                                                
30 See Moody’s (2001, p. 6), for example. 21
pension liabilities while the remaining corporations deteriorate in quality. Risk-adjusted 
premiums are one way to mitigate adverse selection effects and are consistent with a generally 
higher risk awareness among financial institutions. The newly established Pension Protection 
Fund in UK, for example, is currently implementing a risk-adjusted premium structure based 
on EL. Sweden is taking another approach: corporations which cannot maintain investment 
grade status are simply forced to fully cover their pension liabilities by buying annuities.
In 2005, the management board of the PSVaG expressed the need to change the financing 
system. In the long run, the reformed system could be the basis for risk-adjusted premiums. 
The management board justifies the reform with the risk of a shrinking insurance volume and 
the fact that nowadays the pre-funding of pensions is widely accepted. 
We analyze two risk-adjusted pricing methodologies. First, we apply an expected loss pricing 
that recognizes each firm’s default risk and the volume of pension provisions. The results 
show that for investment grade corporations the premiums would substantially decline. For 
some top-rated companies they would almost vanish. However, for sub-investment grade 
firms they would multiply. For the 30 largest corporations the premium would decline by an 
average of one-quarter. For small and medium-sized the premium would more than double. 
Second, we calculate risk-adjusted premiums based on marginal risk contributions, thereby 
taking into account the fact that pension provisions and asset correlations increase with firm 
size, leading to an increasing severity of the highest losses. Within this pricing regime, 
variation of premiums would be less pronounced than under expected loss pricing.
The ultimate solution might include elements of both pricing plans, in order to ensure a fair 
loss-sharing policy among different interest groups.22
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